Unplanned Interruptions Report

For the assessment period ended 31 March 2026

This report was prepared by Clarus, the owner of Firstlight Network during the disclosure year from 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026. Powerco Limited acquired upstream ownership of Firstlight Network Limited on 31 July 2026, after the end of the assessment period, and the report is therefore being approved and signed by the current Powerco-appointed Directors of Firstlight.

Contents page

Executive summary

Firstlight Network owns and maintains the electricity distribution assets that supply Gisborne, Wairoa and the East Coast providing electricity to approximately 26,200 customers over an area of approximately 12,000 square km. These regions are geographically isolated with challenging topography and limited access. The network area is predominantly rural with two urban centres. Firstlight Network is subject to price-quality regulation administered under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986. Within each assessment period we are required to comply with the annual unplanned interruption reliability assessment by not exceeding quality limits, namely unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI. For the assessment period that ended 31 March 2026, we exceeded our unplanned SAIDI limit.[1] Accordingly, to meet the compliance requirements, we must provide the Commerce Commission with this 'unplanned interruption report' and make this report publicly available on our website.[2] We did not exceed our SAIFI limit.

Unplanned interruptions and their causes

Our SAIDI has improved when compared to the previous three years, demonstrated in Figure 1, and by our investigations summarised in Section 2.

Figure 1: Normalised SAIDI performance



[1] FINAL Electricity Distribution Services Default Price Quality Path Determination 2025 - 20November2024.pdf
[2] Firstlight Network/regulatory-information

Section 2 shows the significant contributors to our SAIDI. These were a combination of:

- Equipment failures,
- Vegetation,
- Unknown causes, and
- Adverse weather

During the assessment period we experienced four major SAIDI events, each discussed in detail in Section 4. One was caused by extreme winds, which caused damage to overhead conductors on four of our 11 kV distribution network feeders. These four feeders cover a significant total distance of about 640 km over terrain that can be difficult to access, especially in such weather. Another event was caused by an extreme weather event in which 200 mm of rain fell over 24 hours. This washed-out poles and flooding restricted access to repair poles. Two further events were caused by equipment failures.

Our internal investigations have examined trends in all causes of unplanned interruptions. These are summarised in Section 5, and have identified that, in all years, adverse weather and vegetation (trees falling on power lines and infrastructure) are the cause of most unplanned events and contribution to SAIDI. The exception is this assessment period, when defective equipment contributed the most to SAIDI.

Unplanned outage contribution to SAIDI from defective equipment is trending up. Further investigation of defective equipment contribution to unplanned outages shows that:

- Overhead lines (conductors) and poles and crossarms have the highest contribution to SAIDI over time
- It is overhead lines themselves (as distinct from joints, bindings, and terminations) that have the highest contribution to SAIDI
- The largest contributors within the poles and crossarms category to faults and SAIDI are, in order: insulators, crossarms, followed by hardwood poles
- Zone substation faults are low in number, and on average have a low contribution to SAIDI. However, in this assessment period, due to a single fault, zone substation faults had the highest contribution to SAIDI. This is due to the large number of consumers it affected. This calls for a focus on avoiding and addressing the root cause of zone substation and sub-transmission interruptions.

Our improvement programmes

To manage our improvement, we are implementing actions from our Strategic Reliability Management Plan and specific objectives shown in Figure 2 are measured improvements for return to compliance, based on the average normalised SAIDI for RY22 to RY25 as a starting point.

Figure 2: Return to compliance path



We continue with pole inspections, including implementing industry standard inspection requirements, plans to build new zone-substations to reduce customers per feeder, and deploy generators to restore power while we work to restore the network after events.

Vegetation was the second highest contributor to SAIDI in this assessment period. Within the vegetation category, the highest contributor to SAIDI were out-of-zone followed by in-zone non-plantation trees. Since we took ownership of the network, we have invested in tree management. Large reductions in SAIDI contribution from vegetation are shown on the feeders we have concentrated tree management on. We continue to invest in vegetation management, and have prioritised the next set of feeders to concentrate on.

We have instituted reliability improvement programmes including improved feeder sectionalisation to reduce the number of customers affected by an outage and line fault indicators to reduce restoration time.

We have numerous other improvements underway, managed through our SRMP, which are discussed in Section 6.

In addition to our internal investigations of issues and our improvement programmes, detailed in Section 6, we have commissioned three external independent reviews of our operational practices and network. Further to this, two other externally commissioned reviews by Electrical Network Authority and the Commerce Commission of our network have provided recommendations. These are discussed in Section 3. The recommendations from our external review of unplanned interruptions, another completed in the last year independently assesses our resilience management maturity, and another, also completed in the last year, assesses our asset management maturity. These have led to actions for improvement of our operational practices. The recommendations made have either been completed, form part of our SRMP or are being assessed for appropriate implementation. Examples of recommendations being progressed include:

- Continue with automation, fault indication and increased pole replacement rate
- Increase consumer engagement
- Review and improve outage response process
- Reduction of ICP's on some heavily loaded feeders
- Generator installation on Raupunga feeder
- Improving conductor condition assessment
- Create switching library
- Critical spares
- Securing fuel supply
- Investigate viable network interconnections for security

We are committed to continuing to improve our network performance

Our quality has improved since RY22 to this assessment period and is trending towards compliance by RY27. With our focus on more rapid location and resolution of faults, focus on defective equipment and vegetation, and implementation of recommendations from independent reviews, we are confident of continuing improvement in our quality. We are committed to continuing our investigations into our network performance each year, with the aim to continuously improve the quality of supply to our customers.

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This report has been prepared to document and explain the breach of the Quality Threshold during the period from 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026 (Regulatory Year 2026, or RY26). During RY26, the unplanned SAIDI threshold was exceeded, while performance remained within the unplanned SAIFI threshold.[3, 4, 5] As a result of the unplanned SAIDI breach, this report has been provided to the Commerce Commission (the Commission) to outline the circumstances contributing to the breach, assess its causes, and describe any relevant corrective actions or mitigation measures. [6] The report will be made publicly available at the same time on our website[7] https://firstlightnetwork.co.nz/.

1.2 Who are we

Firstlight Network is the lines company that supplies electricity to consumers in the Tairāwhiti and Wairoa regions, shown in Figure 3. We own and maintain the distribution lines, poles, conductors and underground cabling that supply electricity to approximately 26,100 customers. We also own the region's high-voltage electricity sub-transmission network (including the 110 kV lines that connect the regions to the national grid). The Tairāwhiti and Wairoa regions are geographically isolated with challenging topography and limited access. The network covers an area of 12,000 square kilometres. which is predominantly rural with two urban centres. For these reasons our customer connections density, measured in connections per kilometre of line, is very low, as shown in Figure 4.

Firstlight Network is part of the wider Clarus Group. Clarus is one of New Zealand's largest energy groups with businesses that touch many aspects of the energy supply chain including Rockgas, Firstgas, Firstlight Network, First Renewables and Flexgas. Clarus acquired Firstlight Network, previously known as Eastland Network, from the Eastland Group on 31 March 2023. In October 2025, a conditional sale and purchase agreement was entered in to with Powerco Limited for Firstlight Network. This transaction was concluded on 1st August 2026.

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[3] Unplanned SAIDI results from unplanned interruptions, referred to as Class C interruptions.
[4] Refer to clause 9.8(a) of the Commerce Commission, Electricity Distribution Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2025 (the DPP Determination).
[5] SAIDI is system average interruption duration index, used to measure the duration of interruptions. SAIFI is system average interruption frequency index, used to measure the frequency of interruptions. Combined, SAIDI and SAIFI are used to measure quality of electricity supply.
[6] As required by Clause 12.3(a) of the DPP Determination.
[7] As required by Clause 12.3(b) of the DPP Determination.

Figure 3: Firstlight Network supply area



Figure 4: Firstlight Networks' customer density (shown in green) compared to that of other electricity distribution businesses.



1.3 We are a regulated service provider

Firstlight Network is subject to price-quality regulation administered under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 1986. The Commerce Commission regulates the maximum annual revenue we can earn from our customers and the minimum quality of service we must deliver. Clause 9.7 of the DPP Determination [1] requires non-exempt electricity distribution businesses (EDBs), within each assessment period[8], to comply with the annual unplanned reliability assessment specified in clause 9.8(a) for that assessment period. To comply with the annual unplanned interruption reliability assessment, non-exempt EDBs must not exceed the unplanned SAIDI limit, or the unplanned SAIFI limit specified in paragraph (1) of Schedule 3.2 of the DPP Determination. For the assessment period that ended 31 March 2026, we exceeded our unplanned SAIDI limit. Our unplanned SAIDI performance, as reported in our RY 2026 Annual Compliance Statement, is shown in Table 1. We made considerable improvement and did not exceed our unplanned SAIFI limit as shown in table 1(b)

Table 1: (a) Performance against the unplanned SAIDI limit, RY26.

Unplanned interruptions quality standard RY26 – SAIDI		
Unplanned SAIDI assessed value ≤ Unplanned SAIDI limit		
Unplanned SAIDI limit		230.43
Unplanned SAIDI assessed value	Sum of normalised SAIDI values for Class C interruptions commencing within the assessment period	253.93
Compliance result		Not Compliant
Unplanned RAW SAIDI		337.05

(b) Performance against the unplanned SAIFI limit, RY26

Unplanned interruptions quality standard RY26 – SAIFI		
Unplanned SAIFI assessed value ≤ Unplanned SAIFI limit		
Unplanned SAIFI limit		3.31
Unplanned SAIFI assessed value	Sum of normalised SAIFI values for Class C interruptions commencing within the assessment period	2.11
Compliance result		Compliant
Unplanned RAW SAIFI		2.77

[8] The 12-month period between 1 April and 31 March.

1.4 We exceeded our unplanned SAIDI limit during this assessment period

For this assessment period, we did not comply with clause 9.8(a) of the DPP Determination because we exceeded our unplanned SAIDI limit, as shown in Table 1(a). Accordingly, we must:

a) provide the Commission with this 'unplanned interruption reporting' specified in clause 12.4 of the DPP Determination within five months after the end of that assessment period; and

b) make this 'unplanned interruptions reporting' available on our website; a copy of this report is available at firstlightnetwork.co.nz.

We did meet our unplanned SAIFI limit, and therefore have not reported on that, unless it has a bearing on our analysis of unplanned outages, causes of unplanned outages, and our improvement plans.

1.5 Structure of this Unplanned Interruptions Report

This report examines the factors contributing to unplanned outages and the resulting non-compliance with SAIDI performance targets. Unplanned outages arise from unexpected events, such as equipment failure or adverse weather, rather than scheduled network maintenance.

- Section 2 - to understand the drivers of these outages, we begin by understanding the trends in SAIDI over time. Extensive analysis has been undertaken to identify their root causes. The findings of this analysis are presented and discussed in Section 5.

- Section 3 – we provide the key findings and recommendations from independent reviews of our management and operational practices.

- Section 4 – we provide detail from our analysis of major events that made a significant contribution to SAIDI performance.

- Section 5 – we provide analysis from internal investigations into the causes of non-compliance and identify opportunities for improvement.

- Section 6 – we provide detail on the causes of SAIDI non-compliance and the initiatives we are implementing to improve network performance. The achievement of SAIFI compliance in RY26 provides evidence that these initiatives are delivering positive results.

- Section 7 – we provide an outline of reviews and intended analysis to drive continuous improvement of network reliability and customer service outcomes.

- Section 8 – we include the signed director certification in the form set out in schedule 10 of the DPP Determination

Where SAIDI values are given in this report they are the raw SAIDI values, unless otherwise stated. This means that they have not been through the normalisation[9] process that limits the contribution of an outage to the Major Event Day Threshold value of 18.8 minutes. SAIDI units are customer minutes.

1.6 Data sources

Numerous figures and tables present information about SAIDI and interruptions throughout. The main source of data for these is our internal reliability review, prepared for our Asset Management Committee:

- Firstlight Network 2026. RY2026 Reliability Review. Internal Firstlight Network report prepared for the Asset Management Committee [2].

Where a chart or table is from another source, that source is either referenced or listed.

[9] Electricity Distribution Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2025 – schedule 13

2 Unplanned interruptions and their causes, leading to our SAIDI non-compliance

This section explains our unplanned SAIDI performance for the assessment period, including the interruptions that contributed to the result and the reasons we did not comply with the annual unplanned SAIDI limit. It begins with an overview of performance, compares cumulative SAIDI to previous years and discusses the impact of the major event threshold. It then identifies the main contributors to SAIDI across our network.

In a separate Excel Workbook, available on our website, we have reported the following for each unplanned Class C interruption for the RY26 assessment period[10]:

- start date and time,
- end date and time,
- SAIDI value of the unplanned interruption,
- SAIFI value of the unplanned interruption, and
- the cause.

Any questions about the above data should be directed to us at (+64) 6 869 0700 or info@firstlightnetwork.co.nz.

2.1 Overview of SAIDI

During this assessment period, we exceeded our annual unplanned SAIDI limit by 23.5 SAIDI minutes normalised (or +10%). We did not exceed our SAIFI limit.

While we breached our limit, we note that the change in boundary limit from DPP3 to DPP4 had a material impact. The boundary limit increased by 44% from 13.1 to 18.8 minutes while the Limit was capped at a 5% increase. This means that fewer events met the MED definition and each of the events also retained a larger residual amount. To demonstrate our actual improvement on a 'like for like / equivalent' basis, we have provided in Figure 5, our performance in RY26 normalised based on the DPP3 criteria and compared it to the DPP3 performance. We have also included the RY26 performance based on the DPP4 criteria to highlight the impact caused by the changed values. This boundary limit is subject of a quality standard variation application.

[10] As required by clause 12.4(a) of the DPP determination

Figure 5: SAIDI performance trend



Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that our underlying performance has significantly improved, exceeding the limit by only 0.35 (219.81-219.46) minutes over the DPP3 limit. Importantly, our customers experience has improved compared to recent past performance. The implementation of our SRMP will ensure ongoing improvement and return to compliance based on the DPP4 criteria.

While we exceeded the limit, we have been implementing several improvement initiatives that are the outcome of past reviews and improvement initiatives and have been consolidated into our new Strategic Reliability Management Plan. The SRMP demonstrates that with the expected cumulative effect of all the reliability specific tasks, as well as ongoing condition-based asset replacement, we have a path to return to compliance by RY27, and we have demonstrated material improvement in performance.

Figure 6 summarises our network's SAIDI performance by month compared to the Limit. It shows that while we were tracking close to the limit, major events in December and January contributed enough after normalisation for us to exceed the limit.

There were four periods in which normalisation of SAIDI occurred:

- October 2025,
- December 2025 (two separate occasions), and
- January 2026.

Major events that led to these normalisation periods are discussed in Section 4.

Figure 6: RY26 Unplanned normalised SAIDI performance.



Figure 7 shows the number of fault interruption events per day. This shows a particularly large event near the beginning of December 2025, leading to a high fault count. Events also occurred during October 2025, and January 2026. These major events are discussed in Section 4 and largely resulted from severe weather events, with two being from equipment failure.

Figure 7: RY26 Fault interruption event numbers by day period.



Figure 8 shows the SAIDI by day. In some cases, such as in early December, SAIDI aligns with the number of events. However, the relationship is not consistent, as the SAIDI amount depends on the number of customers interrupted and restoration time not just the number of interruptions. Section 5 discusses this in more detail based on our internal investigations and findings.

Figure 8: RY26 SAIDI by day.



2.2 Cumulative SAIDI

The impact of the major events in October, December and January can be seen in the raw SAIDI in Figure 9 (a). The final performance for the year, as measured by SAIDI (raw - Figure 9 (a) and normalised - Figure 9 (b)), improved significantly over previous years, in part, due to the reliability improvement initiatives that have been implemented during the past two years. These initiatives are addressed further in Section 5.3 and Section 6.

Figure 9: Cumulative SAIDI (a) raw, and (b) normalised (y-axis is SAIDI minutes and note the y-axis scale difference between the two graphs).

(a) Raw SAIDI



(b) normalised SAIDI



As can be seen from 9(b), the normalised SAIDI performance in RY26 demonstrates improvement over the past three years. However, it is still a non-compliant result. RY26 is the first year of DPP4, with the new DPP4 limit and threshold applied. While the DPP4 limit has increased by 5%, the threshold for normalisation has increased by 44%. In turn the number of events that have been normalised in RY26 has reduced compared to the number that would have been reduced with the DPP3 threshold. Consequently, the normalised SAIDI in 9(b) is not reduced by as much as the previous years. Thus, the comparison of normalised SAIDI in RY26 to that of the previous years in 9(b) is not on an equal basis; had the DPP3 normalisation been applied to RY26, RY26's SAIDI would have been even lower, as presented in Figure 5.

The improvement in reliability (reduction in SAIDI), as measured by SAIDI and SAIFI, over previous years can, in part, be attributed to improvement measures we have taken. These are discussed in Section 6.

2.3 Contributors to SAIDI in RY26

Contributing factors to SAIDI in RY26 are shown in Figure 10. From this the main contributors to SAIDI were

Equipment failures,

Vegetation,

Unknown causes,

and Adverse weather.

Figure 10: Contributors to SAIDI in the RY26 assessment period.



The trends of each of the causes over time are important to identify where deterioration in performance is occurring. To achieve this, we have commissioned several reviews of our network performance during the preceding three regulatory periods (refer to section 3) and undertaken additional analysis of the performance of each of these causes in Section 5 to identify where trends exist and draw out the areas requiring focus.

3 Independent reviews of Firstlight's network and operational practices

This section sets out independent reviews[11] of the state of our network or operational practices completed in the assessment period of RY26 or any of the three preceding assessment period.

To independently assess our state of maturity in our resilience management and asset management practices and to identify areas for improvement, we commissioned independent reviews in RY24, and during the RY26 assessment period as set out in Table 2 [3]. These reviews build on assessments commissioned during previous regulatory periods, which are summarised in earlier unplanned interruptions reports.

Further to these Firstlight commissioned reviews, Electricity Networks Aotearoa engaged Energia in RY23 to review the response by EDB's impacted by cyclone Gabrielle in February 2023. The Commerce Commission engaged an independent Engineer to review Firstlight Network practices and provide an expert opinion post RY26.

Many of the findings and conclusions from the reports listed in Table 2, along with findings from our internal reviews, are built into our Strategic Reliability Management Plan (SRMP), discussed in Section 6.

Table 2: Independent reviews of our network and operational practices.

Review	Reviewer	Date
Electricity Distribution Sector Cyclone Gabrielle review	Energia (for Electricity Networks Aotearoa)	13 July 2023
Unplanned interruptions review, April-November 2023	PBA	16 January 2024
Resilience management maturity assessment RY26	Asset Dynamics	24 November 2025
Asset management maturity assessment RY26	Asset Dynamics	4 November 2025
Expert opinion Firstlight Network Limited quality standard non-compliance 2022/23 to 2024/25	Nuttall (for Commerce Commission	15 June 2026

3.1 Unplanned interruptions review by PBA

The report by consultants Pringle Beleski and Associates Ltd (PBA) was commissioned in December 2023 but its findings and recommendations are still relevant to the RY26 period. PBA were engaged to analyse our reliability performance and review our systems and processes.

[11] As required by clause 12.4(b) of the DPP determination

PBA accordingly prepared reports during RY2024 covering their analysis of general network and non-network measures for reducing unplanned interruptions and made several continuous improvement action recommendations which have been progressed and included in our SRMP:

Network recommendations

- Study network load flow/fault levels – Not yet started
- Carry out a risk-based review and prioritisation of asset maintenance and renewal programs - Ongoing
- Specific asset fleet strategy on insulators - Complete
- Review application of network protection devices - Complete
- Establish rigorous Reliability Safety Environment CAPEX program - Complete
- Study root cause of worst-performing feeders and implement solutions - Ongoing
- Upgrade network assets for increased back up capability

Non-Network Recommendations

- Embed Clarus risk management framework - Complete
- Accelerate plans to improve Asset Management System - Ongoing
- Plan and implement targeted special projects to reduce risk for the most critical sections of the network - ongoing
- Security of Supply: review levels set - Ongoing
- Invest in vegetation surveys -Ongoing
- Prioritise alignment to asset management standards – Ongoing

3.2 Resilience management maturity assessment RY26

The Electricity Engineers Association (EEA) of New Zealand has developed a tool for assessing resilience management maturity. Its purpose is to support electricity distribution businesses (EDBs) like ours to assess, track, and strengthen their network resilience against major disruptive events like natural disasters or severe weather. Given the frequency and severity of such events in the assessment periods since we took ownership of the network, we commissioned Asset Dynamics to carry out asset management and resilience management assessments in September and October 2025 [4].

Asset Dynamics assessed our maturity against the 71 questions of the EEA's Resilience Management Maturity Assessment Tool (RMMAT). The purpose was to provide an independent assessment of our resilience practices and identify areas for improvement.

By carrying out the EEA RMMAT assessment, each of the categories listed in Table 6 receives a score in maturity levels, indicating how well developed the organisation's resilience management practices are. The maturity levels are listed in 3, with results achieved from the assessment.

Table 3: RMMAT maturity levels from the EEA Resilience Guide.

	Maturity level	**Maturity description**	**Scoring Achieved (Questions)**
0	Not aware	The organisation has not recognised the need for this requirement, and / or there is no evidence of a commitment to put it in place.	0
1	Aware	The organisation has identified the need for this requirement and there is evidence of an intent to progress it.	2
2	Developing	The organisation has identified the means of systematically and consistently achieving the requirement and can demonstrate that progress is being made with credible, and resourced plans in place.	20
3	Competent	The organisation can demonstrate that it systematically and consistently achieved the relevant requirement. Only minor inconsistencies may exist.	49
4	Excellent	The organisation can demonstrate that it consistently exceeds their requirements. It employs and fosters leading local and international practises and has a mature continuous improvement culture to ensure a high standard of maturity and compliance is maintained.	0

The results achieved from the assessment are classified into four categories listed in 4.[12] These are consistent with New Zealand's integrated approach to civil defence emergency management (CDEM).

[12] Further information about the EEA resilience guide and RMMAT can be found in this article by Asset Dynamics.

Table 4: The EEA's Resilience Management Maturity Assessment Tool categories.

Phase	Explanation	Average Maturity Level Achieved
Reduction	Identifying risks and permanently eliminating or mitigating them	2.50
Readiness	Building operational systems and capabilities before a crisis	2.86
Response	Taking actions during or right after an emergency to save lives and protect property	2.78
Recovery	Restoring and regenerating a community over the short and long term	3.00

The assessment found that our network resilience systems and processes are generally in the range of Maturity Level 2, Developing (20 of 71 questions), to Maturity Level 3, Competent (49 of 71 questions). Two questions were within Maturity Level 1, Aware. Both questions were within the "Reduction" phase and "Network Spares" function.

As noted in the resilience management maturity assessment for RY26

> *These findings reflect a business that has implemented many resilience management fundamentals with strengths in some areas. Gaps exist in current strategies, plans and processes associated with Network Spares, and there are opportunities in some areas to enhance and formalise systems and processes, particularly in the cases where these processes depend upon tacit knowledge held by key personnel.*

The assessment identified strengths in our resilience management practices as well as opportunities for improvement. The opportunities for improvement are being considered in the plans summarised in Section 6.

3.3 Asset management maturity assessment RY26

We continue to improve our asset management capability, in line with our belief that strong asset management drives efficient delivery and benefit to our customers. To achieve this, we are working to improve our asset management practices and align with the industry standard ISO55001.

To support and guide these efforts, we commissioned Asset Dynamics to independently carry out the asset management maturity assessment in September 2025 [5] using the Commissions Asset Management Maturity Assessment Tool (AMMAT) [13]. More information about the assessment and our approach to it is given in our Asset

[13] The AMMAT was adapted from the international PAS 55 Assessment Methodology (PAM) and comprises 31 questions. PAS 55:2008 Assessment Methodology (PAM) tool was developed by the Institute of Asset Management.

Management Plan dated 31 March 2026 [6].

The 31 questions are designed to understand the maturity of an organisation's asset management practices across the six core areas set out in Table 5

Table 5: AMMAT core areas.

Asset strategy and delivery
Documentation controls and review
Themes integration and information management
Communication and participation
Structure capability and authority
Competency and training

Like the resilience management maturity assessment test, the asset management maturity assessment test indicates the maturity of the organisation's asset management practices, with the results from the assessment included in Table 6.

Table 6: AMMAT maturity levels.

	Maturity level	Average Maturity Level Achieved
0	Innocent	0
1	Aware	1
2	Developing	15
3	Competent	15
4	Excellent	0

The assessment found that our asset management practices generally range from Maturity Level 2, Developing (15 of 31 questions), to Maturity Level 3, Competent (15 of 31 questions). Maturity level 1, Aware, was assessed for one question associated with documentation of our asset management system.

As noted in the asset management maturity assessment for RY26

> *These findings reflect a business that has implemented most asset management fundamentals but, in some cases, processes are not formalised or controlled or are not yet fully implemented. An integrated asset management system that provides governance across all asset management activities has not yet been established; however recent work is developing critical elements of the system.*

The assessment identified strengths in our asset management practices as well as opportunities for improvement. The opportunities for improvement are being considered in the plans summarised in Section 6 and incorporated in the SRMP.

4 SAIDI Major events

This section addresses SAIDI major events that occurred in the assessment period. It also sets out investigations into the major events[14]:

- Section 4.1 summarises the major events in RY26,
- Section 4.2 describes our approach to restoration following an event based on good industry practice
- Sections 4.3 to 4.6 address each major event, providing a summary of the major event details, the impact on Firstlight's consumers, how we responded to the event, issues that hindered resolution, investigation, and lessons learned.

The information presented below is sourced from our internal investigations into, and reporting of, major events.

For reference, Section 9 provides a map showing network feeders and zone substations, as the major events descriptions discuss the feeders affected.

4.1 Summary of unplanned SAIDI major events

A SAIDI major event is defined in the DPP Determination [1] as a period of 24 hours where the sum of SAIDI over that period for unplanned interruptions exceeds the SAIDI unplanned boundary value. For reporting major events, we have reported consecutive days as a single major event. They are set out in Table 7.

Normalisation assesses the outage for each 30min period. The contribution from that period is the lesser of the actual SAIDI incurred or 1/48 of the SAIDI major event boundary value. Hence, for each 24-hour period of a Major Event, the maximum contribution to SAIDI is the SAIDI major event boundary value.

Table 7: SAIDI major events in RY26.

Start	End	Raw SAIDI	Normalised unplanned SAIDI
27 October 2025 5:30	28 October 2025 17:30	21.3337	6.2689
2 December 2025 17:30	4 December 2025 16:30	34.4805	6.4324
7 December 2025 20:00	9 December 2025 15:00	20.8239	1.8142
21 January 2026 20:00	23 January 2026 9:30	24.4422	3.4395

[14] As required by clause 12.4(c) of the DPP determination.

4.2 Our risk-based approach to restoration follows good industry practice

Following considerable effort by EEA working groups, we changed our fault restoration practices in June 2021 to better align with industry risk-based approaches. Rather than waiting for a fixed length of time for members of the public to notify us of unsafe lines, we now endeavour to patrol the line before performing a manual reclose. That is, before restoring supply, we patrol the faulted line to ascertain and establish what line damage has occurred. For example, in storms it is possible for a tree to damage our lines causing conductors to come down, or to cause multiple points of damage. Patrolling enables us to identify the damage and to assess public safety hazards before restoring supply.

Our risk-based approach aligns with the EEA Guides and industry standards. We are comfortable that while patrolling under a risk-based approach adds time until restoration, the approach enables an informed assessment of public safety hazards and aligns with good industry practices.

To offset the impact from increased restoration time we have been installing automation that reduces the number of customers impacted by an event, dependent on the location, and fault indicators which leads to faster location of the fault. This is linked with action 9 in Table 33.

4.3 SAIDI major event 27 October 2025 to 28 October 2025

Between 27 October 2025 and 28 October 2025 extreme wind caused 21 individual faults over the region during the normalising period.

4.3.1 Event details (location and equipment involved)

16 feeders across the Gisborne and Wairoa areas were affected. The feeders contributing the most SAIDI were:

- Waimatā,
- Mātāwai,
- Raupunga and
- Tahora.

The majority of the faults were due to wind causing line clashes and damaging conductors on the overhead 11kV network.

4.3.2 Impact

As a result of this weather event, Firstlight's consumers incurred a SAIDI of 21.51 minutes (rounded), adjusted to 6.29 minutes (rounded) with boundary value adjustment.

4.3.3 How we responded to the event

Faultpersons and line-mechanics were dispatched, and normal fault isolation principles engaged – that being to prioritise faults with the most customers affected.

4.3.4 Factors that exacerbated or hindered resolution of the major event

Work on the Waimatā feeder was underway, with fault-persons onsite when a Transpower outage due to a lightning strike disrupted supply to all of Gisborne and Wairoa. This meant that the fault finding and restoration work could not continue, and restoration for 574 customers was delayed by 3 hours adding approximately 4 SAIDI to the event.

On one fault on the Mātāwai feeder, it was too windy to remove fuses required for further fault-finding, and restoration for 56 customers was delayed until the following day, resulting in two SAIDI. Another fault on the Mātāwai feeder had restoration delayed until the following day for 40 customers due to a tree falling across the access road resulting in an additional 0.7 SAIDI.

4.3.5 Lessons and actions to reduce the risk of future major events

Matawai and Waimata, identified as worse performing feeders in RY26 are prioritised for inspection in RY27 to identify corrective work. A generator is programmed to be installed on the Raupunga feeder in August 2026.

Since RY24 we have been implementing reliability specific improvement programs which have been consolidated and enhanced through the development of our SRMP. An accelerated pole replacement programme is underway. We are continuing to advance our rural automation programme, installing additional protection devices on spur lines so that a downstream fault does not disrupt supply to larger numbers of upstream customers. Further to this a LIDAR survey of the network has been programmed which will provide information to drive improvement initiatives. Refer section 6 table 28 action 3.

Many of these programmes are addressed in Section 6.

4.4 SAIDI major event 2 December 2025 to 4 December 2025

Between 2 December 2025 and 4 December 2025, a flashover in 11 kV switchgear caused transformer and feeder protection to trip.

4.4.1 Event details (location and equipment involved)

This single event occurred at the Kaiti zone substation. The flashover in 11 kV switchgear caused the 50 kV transformer circuit breaker and the 11 kV incomer feeder circuit breaker to trip on over-current.

The initial fault started with a flashover at CB A516, which is the 11 kV incomer circuit breaker at Kaiti sub-station, Gisborne. A subsequent cable joint failure occurred between A477 and A432 due to additional load from back feeding the Kaiti sub-station from the Crawford feeder.

Kaiti zone-substation in Gisborne supplies the following feeders (with customer numbers in brackets). All feeders and therefore all 3,327 customers lost supply for 24 to 31 minutes:

- Herschell (175)
- Dalton (824)
- Tamarau (1,060)
- Wainui (676)
- Whāngārā (591)
- Kaiti Sub LS (1)
- The Crawford feeder (945) was also affected due to a cable joint failure while the Kaiti sub-station was being fed by Crawford.

4.4.2 Impact

As a result of this equipment failure event, Firstlight's consumers incurred a SAIDI of 34.66 minutes, adjusted to 6.49 minutes with boundary value adjustment.

4.4.3 How we responded to the event[15]

Following the trip at 08:51 on 3 December 2025 the smoke alarm activated, FENZ was called, and Kaiti substation was ventilated using external fans to make the environment safe for further inspection. The control team carried out switching to restore all customers via back feeding from Crawford Road (Port Sub). All customers were restored by 09:22.

At 17:08, a failed cable joint between the feeders tripped all customers on Kaiti sub-station again, plus additional customers on the Crawford Road feeder, which was back feeding Kaiti sub-station. All customers were restored with alternative switching by 20:43 on 3 December 2025. Permanent repairs were made while the network remained in alternative configuration. The network was returned to normal configuration on 19 December 2025.

4.4.4 Factors that exacerbated or hindered resolution of the major event

Network configuration allowed back feeding until permanent repairs could be made, however this meant that additional customers were affected when the cable joint failure occurred. If the network was in normal configuration, the customers on the Crawford feeder would not have lost supply.

4.4.5 Lessons and actions to reduce the risk of future major events

The root cause of the fault was poor climate control in the substation and ingress of water within the substation cable duct, resulting in condensation in the switch, providing a fault path. The rainfall on the morning of the event was significant[16]. The actions in progress are to reduce water ingress, implement improved management of environmental control, review of protection settings, and improve our inspection scope.

In the longer term we are considering adding another sub-station (as identified in Section 6) to the network to better balance load, reduce customer numbers on larger feeders, and provide more alternatives for back feeding in a fault situation.

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[15] Dates and times of trips and switching actions by Firstlight Network operators may not align with major event times. This is due to the definition of a major event being based on when normalisation of SAIDI occurred.

[16] Metservice recorded 52.4mm of rain on 3rd December 2025

4.5 SAIDI major event 7 December 2025 to 9 December 2025

On 8 December a cable crutch[17] on a pole failed. This was related to the cable failure that occurred on 3 December 2025 as described in Section 4.4. This outage lasted until 9 December 2025.

4.5.1 Event details (location and equipment involved)

On 8 December 2025, CB A612 tripped while supplying Herschell, Dalton and Tamarau. The origin of this section of the fault was a blown cable crutch at pole A6458 (near A575). This is normally an open point between Crawford and Whāngārā feeders that was closed while the network was in alternative configuration due to the outage described in Section 4.4. The following feeders were affected:

- Herschell
- Dalton
- Tamarau
- Whāngārā
- Wainui
- Kaiti Sub LS
- Crawford
- Esplanade

4.5.2 Impact

As a result of this equipment failure event, Firstlight's consumers incurred a SAIDI of 20.99 minutes, affecting 2818 customers, adjusted to 1.82 minutes with boundary value adjustment. The customers were restored between 48 and 298 minutes

4.5.3 How we responded to the event[18]

Trip time was 19:56 on Monday 8 December. Power was restored to all customers via alternative switching by 00:54 on Tuesday 9 December. Permanent repairs were made to the cable by 16:05 on Tuesday 9 December.

[17] A cable crutch is where cores of a cable are joined to one or more other cables or terminations and are therefore susceptible to failure.

[18] Dates and times of trips and switching actions by Firstlight Network operators may not align with major event times. This is due to the definition of a major event being based on when normalisation of SAIDI occurred.

4.5.4 Factors that exacerbated or hindered resolution of the major event

Network configuration allowed back feeding until permanent repairs could be made, however this meant that additional customers were affected when the cable crutch failure occurred. If the network had been in normal configuration, the customers on the Crawford feeder would not have lost supply.

4.5.5 Lessons and actions to reduce the risk of future major events

Refer to Section 4.4.5 for lessons and actions from the first SAIDI major event in December.

4.6 SAIDI major event 21 January 2026 to 23 January 2026

An extreme weather event occurred across the region from 21 to 22 January 2026. More than 200mm of rain fell in Hicks Bay during this time, resulting in flooding and slips.

4.6.1 Event details (location and equipment involved)

The worst of the storm hit the East Cape, North of Tolaga Bay, but the whole region was affected. Figure 11 shows the extent of flooding and slips in one location.

The main contributing fault (12.3 SAIDI minutes) for this normalising period was caused by a pole near Wharf Road, Hicks Bay, being washed out in a flood. The next biggest fault (5.3 SAIDI minutes) during this time was on East Cape Road, on the Te Araroa feeder. This was caused by a second pole being washed out in a flood.

Faults on 11 kV overhead lines on the Hicks Bay, Te Araroa, Tauwhareparae, Raupunga, Ruakituri, Mahia, Whatatutu and Lavenham feeders contributed most of the SAIDI.

4.6.2 Impact

As a result of this extreme weather event, Firstlight's consumers incurred a SAIDI of 24.641 minutes, adjusted to 3.445 minutes with boundary value adjustment. It is estimated that approximately 16.7 SAIDI was attributable to delays in accessing the faults during this event[19].

4.6.3 How we responded to the event[20]

Faultpersons and line-mechanics were dispatched, and normal fault isolation principles engaged (as stated earlier, procedure is to prioritise faults with the most customers affected).

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[19] Source – Firstlight document - Access issues and impact on SAIDI – 22Jan extreme weather event.xlsx

[20] Dates and times of trips and switching actions by Firstlight Network operators may not align with major event times. This is due to the definition of a major event being based on when normalisation of SAIDI occurred.

For the two biggest faults, the response was as follows:

- The Hicks Bay feeder tripped at 7:58pm on 22 January 2026, with 259 customers losing power. 33 customers were restored that evening, but due to road closures, further patrols had to be carried out the following day with a helicopter. 207 customers were restored by midday, but repairs to the fallen pole were not possible due to flooding and road closures, and 19 customers remained off until 26 January 2026. Figure 12 shows the site of pole repair once access was possible.

- On Thursday 22 January at 10:10am it was reported that a conductor was down on East Cape Road. Access to the area was restricted due to slips and flooding. Because of this the line was electrically isolated where access was possible, leaving 24 customers without power. A pole was replaced and conductor repaired when access to the site was possible on 26 January 2026.

4.6.4 Factors that exacerbated or hindered resolution of the major event

There were multiple road closures due to flooding and slips during this time, which delayed our response to six faults. This included the state highway being closed at both ends. We estimate that if access to faults was not restricted, raw SAIDI would be approximately 16.7 minutes lower.

In addition, adverse weather conditions meant that helicopters were unable to fly to carry out line inspections, isolations and repairs.

4.6.5 Lessons and actions to reduce the risk of future major events

We are continuing to implement our Strategic Reliability Management Plan [7], which identifies key initiatives to improve reliability across the network. We are continuing to advance our rural automation programme (see Sections 2 and 6.3), installing additional protection devices so that a downstream fault does not disrupt supply to larger numbers of upstream customers. Also the Hicks Bay feeder will be prioritised for inspection ref section 6, action 8 Table 33.

Figure 11: Aerial photograph of flooding in the Hicks Bay area in January 2026.

Figure 12: January 2026 major event repair of a pole washout after flood waters receded.

5 The causes of unplanned interruptions

This section outlines and summarises our investigations into non-compliance with the annual unplanned SAIDI interruptions assessment[21]. As outlined in Section 2.3, the main contributors to unplanned SAIDI in RY26 were:

- Equipment failures (34.2%),
- Vegetation (16.2%),
- Unknown causes (14.2%), and
- Adverse weather (14.1%)
- Third-party interference (10.6%)
- Wildlife (4.1%)
- Lightning (3.7%)

We have investigated these causes further and provide a summary of results in this section. We assess performance to determine any key events or underlying issues that have contributed to SAIDI. We also examine trends in these contributors to test for sustained deterioration and to identify if there are any underlying systemic issues.

Following this we examine each cause according to:

- Equipment failures in Section 5.2,
- Vegetation in Section 5.3,
- Unknown causes in Section 5.4,
- Adverse weather in Section 5.5,
- Third-party interference in Section 5.6,
- Wildlife in section 5.7, and
- Lightning in section 5.8

[21] As required by clause 12.4(d) and 12.4(e) of the DPP determination

We complete the analysis of causes in Section 5.9 by examining the feeders that contribute most to SAIDI.

For reference, Section 9 provides a map showing network feeders and zone substations, as some of the analysis in this section is by feeder.

5.1 Trends in all contributors to unplanned SAIDI

Trends in contributors to SAIDI are shown in Figure 13. These are presented graphically to enable visual identification of trends rather than analytically calculating a trend by, for example, comparison with an historical average. Since adverse weather and vegetation contributed such high SAIDI values in RY23, they are graphed separately. However, defective equipment is shown alongside these in figure 13b for comparison and to understand the main contributors to SAIDI in RY26.

Note: Figure 13: Trends in SAIDI contributors, showing adverse weather and vegetation separated out from (a) due to scale, and defective equipment from (a) repeated for comparison with adverse weather and vegetation. The order of each cause is by the RY21-RY26 average.

Figure 13: Trends in SAIDI contributors,

(a)



(b)



The graphs in Figure 13 allows identification of the following trends:

- Defective equipment's contribution to SAIDI is trending up steadily and is now the highest contributor in RY26, and was the second highest in RY25, although well below vegetation
- The contribution of unknown causes to SAIDI is trending up steadily
- The contribution of third-party interference to SAIDI is trending up steadily
- The contribution of wildlife to SAIDI is trending up slightly, but is well below the contribution of the other major causes
- Adverse weather is a significant contributor to SAIDI in most years, with RY23 particularly bad
- Contribution of vegetation to SAIDI follows an almost identical pattern to that of adverse weather, for obvious reasons – that windfall adjacent to power infrastructure causes outages. It was particularly bad in RY23 followed by RY25 and RY24
- Similarly, adverse environment follows a similar pattern to adverse weather

To further understand unplanned outages and their sources, we examine the raw quality measures and event counts by voltage level on our network in Table 8. From this we draw several conclusions:

- Fault counts and their impacts are the highest on our 11 kV distribution network.

The two reasons for 11 kV fault count being higher are: (a) there are many more assets and distance of 11 kV distribution, and (b) they are typically radial feeders with N security, consistent with the practice in electricity distribution. To provide N-1 security would be uneconomic.

- The single fault due to equipment failure on the 110 kV sub-transmission had an impact on SAIDI quality similar per event to the 11 kV faults, however the potential impact of a fault on 110kV highlights the **importance of a focus on avoiding 110 kV interruptions.**

- There is a concerning event count with a high impact on quality in the 50 KV sub-transmission, **stressing the importance of finding and addressing the root cause of 50 kV interruptions.**

Table 8: sources of unplanned outages in RY26 and their impact on quality by voltage.

Measure	Sub-transmission			Distribution	Total
	110 kV	50 kV	33 kV	11 kV	
Total SAIDI	0.3	23.9	5.1	307.7	336.9
SAIFI	0.013	0.841	0.137	1.775	2.766
Event count	1	12	3	787	803

Given the above conclusions, we return to understanding the sources of interruption events by cause, *and* by voltage level, in Table 9.

Table 9: Sources of unplanned outage events in RY26 by cause (body of table gives the event count).[22]

Cause	Sub-transmission			Distributior	Total
	110 kV	50 kV	33 kV	11 kV	
Vegetation	0	0	0	96	96
Adverse weather	0	0	1	77	78
Defective equipment	1	6	2	139	148
Adverse environment	0	0	0	13	13
Cause unknown	0	4	0	247	251
Third party interferen	0	1	0	40	41
Wildlife	0	0	0	51	51
Lightning	0	1	0	116	117
Human error	0	0	0	8	8
Total	1	12	3	787	803

[22] The “defective equipment” cause count is 148 in Table 9 while it is 150 in Table 4. The reason for this relates to two events which had two causes of faults (specifically a pole down on location while a conductor was down in another location on the same feeder). Table 9 captures the events, while Table 4 captures the causes, and therefore captures an additional two causes.

Earlier we identified the concerning number of faults in sub-transmission and their impact on quality, particularly in the 50 kV sub-transmission. Table 9 highlights that these faults are primarily caused by defective equipment, helping explain the upward trend in SAIDI from defective equipment shown earlier. The table also shows that the second highest contributor to interruptions on the 50 kV sub-transmission is unknown causes which is also consistent with the upward trend identified earlier for that cause code. Unknown causes also contribute the highest event count on distribution, with next highest being defective equipment.

The higher priority focus areas for improvement are defective equipment, vegetation and unknown causes as these are the highest contributors to SAIDI. In the next sections we examine each of the causes that contribute material SAIDI in RY26.[23] We also examine the contribution of SAIDI from the perspective of worst performing feeders and the key causes. Defective equipment is defined as the premature failure of an asset due to natural and/or operational degradation. Given the upward trend in defective equipment as a fault cause, and it being the highest contributor to SAIDI in RY26, this sub-section investigates the source of unplanned interruptions from defective equipment. We first summarise failures by all equipment categories in 10. Following this we examine each category in more detail in separate tables (Table 11 to Table 15). The aim is to:

(a) understand what equipment failures are contributing most to SAIDI and which should therefore be prioritised, and

(b) look for any trends that may warrant further investigation.

In all cases the number of interruptions and the resulting unplanned SAIDI are given.

5.2 Defective Equipment

Defective equipment failure is defined as the premature failure of an asset due to natural and/or operational degradation. Given the upward trend in defective equipment as a fault cause, and it being the highest contributor to SAIDI in RY26, this sub-section investigates the source of unplanned interruptions from defective equipment. We first summarise failures by all equipment categories in Table 4. Following this we examine each category in more detail in separate tables (Table 5 to Table 8). The aim is to:

(a) understand what equipment failures are contributing most to SAIDI and which should therefore be prioritised, and

(b) look for any trends that may warrant further investigation.

In all cases the number of interruptions and the resulting unplanned SAIDI are given.

[23] Human Error (0%) and Adverse Environment (2.6%) are immaterial and are not discussed.

Table 10: Defective equipment category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Equipment category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Zone substation	3	6	0	0	3	4	2	2
Conductor (overhead line)	42	52	35	51	42	67	44	23
Poles & crossarms	20	39	36	42	54	34	38	-4
Cable	3	13	15	14	15	11	12	-1
Switchgear	20	14	19	12	27	24	18	6
Distribution transformer	18	22	14	16	16	7	17	-10
Generator	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Other defective equipment	0	5	4	3	1	2	3	-1
Other	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	-1
Total	106	151	123	138	162	150	136	14

(b) SAIDI

Equipment category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Zone substation	3	4	0	0	12	42	4	39
Conductor (overhead line)	25	18	35	41	11	29	26	3
Poles & crossarms	7	20	22	56	53	26	31	-5
Cable	0	11	12	18	10	9	10	-1
Switchgear	6	2	1	1	8	6	4	3
Distribution transformer	3	3	2	9	3	2	4	-2
Generator	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0
Other defective equipment	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	-1
Other	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	-1
Total	45	61	73	125	103	115	81	34

– Overhead lines (conductors) and poles and crossarms have the highest event count on average (RY21-RY25) and in RY26 have the second and third respectively highest contribution to SAIDI (on average over the previous years they have the highest contribution to SAIDI). This is consistent with the analysis by system voltage in Table 9 – overhead lines and poles and crossarms are largely distribution voltage equipment and are therefore large in number.

  - Table 5 shows that **the highest contribution to faults and SAIDI from the Conductor category (overhead line) is broken conductors themselves**, with joints, bindings, or terminations contributing to events and SAIDI, but significantly lower than conductors.

  - Table 6 shows that, on average over time, **the largest contributor from poles and crossarms category to faults and SAIDI is insulators, crossarms, followed by hardwood poles**. Concrete and steel poles do not contribute to SAIDI while softwood poles have a minor contribution. This is in part because there are very few steel poles in our network, and there are many more aged hardwood poles.

- Zone substation faults are low in number, and on average have a low contribution to SAIDI. However, in RY26 zone substation faults had the highest contribution to SAIDI. Further investigation shows that this was due to the duration of interruption, which combined with the large number of customers affected, led to an increased SAIDI. Consistent with the 110 kV and 50 kV sub-transmission conclusions from the previous section, this calls for **a focus on avoiding zone substation interruptions.**
- Cable interruptions are high but appear to be steady
- Switch gear interruptions appear to be increasing, although they have a minor contribution to SAIDI
- Distribution transformer interruptions appear to be declining slightly over time. Most faults occur in pole mounted distribution transformers compared to ground mounted distribution transformers. This is in part due to pole mounted distribution transformers being more susceptible to lightning.

Given these conclusions, Section 6 discusses plans to improve sub-transmission, poles, and conductors (overhead), as well as switchgear

Table 11: Conductor (overhead) category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Conductor (overhead line) category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Conductor	16	30	18	25	13	44	20	24
Conductor - joint	13	10	10	14	8	8	11	-3
Conductor - binding	3	3	5	6	10	7	5	2
Conductor - termination	10	9	2	6	11	8	8	0
Total	42	52	35	51	42	67	44	23

(b) SAIDI

Conductor (overhead line) category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Conductor	8	13	8	19	4	20	10	10
Conductor - joint	15	4	23	7	3	1	10	-9
Conductor - binding	2	0	5	11	3	5	4	1
Conductor - termination	1	1	0	5	2	2	2	1
Total	25	18	35	41	11	29	26	3

Table 12: Poles and crossarms category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Poles & crossarms category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Pole hardwood	5	15	13	7	15	20	11	9
Pole concrete	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Pole steel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pole softwood	3	3	0	4	0	1	2	-1
Crossarm	6	17	12	8	15	3	12	-9
Lightning arrestor	0	0	0	0	7	2	1	1
Insulator	6	4	11	23	17	7	12	-5
Total	20	39	36	42	54	34	38	-4

(b) SAIDI

Poles & crossarms category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Pole hardwood	1	4	5	4	22	15	7	8
Pole concrete	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Pole steel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pole softwood	4	1	0	3	0	1	2	-1
Crossarm	1	5	11	14	6	1	7	-6
Lightning arrestor	0	0	0	0	11	3	2	1
Insulator	1	10	5	35	15	5	13	-9
Total	7	20	22	56	53	26	31	-5

Table 13: Cable (underground) category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Cable category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Cable	2	6	9	7	3	5	5	0
Cable - joint	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	-1
Cable - termination	1	6	5	6	12	6	6	0
Total	3	13	15	14	15	11	12	-1

(b) SAIDI

Cable category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Cable	0	5	8	6	3	5	4	1
Cable - joint	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	-1
Cable - termination	0	2	4	12	6	4	5	-1
Total	0	11	12	18	10	9	10	-1

Table 14: Switchgear category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Switchgear category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Switch gear pole mounted	6	3	1	2	2	3	3	0
Switch gear	0	0	1	0	7	5	2	3
Air brake switch (ABS)	3	0	2	2	4	2	2	0
Fuse	11	11	15	8	14	14	12	2
Total	20	14	19	12	27	24	18	6

(b) SAIDI

Switchgear category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Switch gear pole mounted	3	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Switch gear	0	0	0	0	5	3	1	1
Air brake switch (ABS)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Fuse	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0
Total	6	2	1	1	8	6	4	3

Table 15: Distribution transformer category cause of unplanned outages by (a) number of interruptions, and (b) resulting SAIDI.

(a) Event count

Distribution transformer category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Transformer pole mounted	15	18	14	15	13	7	15	-8
Transformer ground moun	3	4	0	1	3	0	2	-2
Total	18	22	14	16	16	7	17	-10

(b) SAIDI

Distribution transformer category	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY25	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Transformer pole mounted	2	2	2	5	2	2	2	-1
Transformer ground moun	1	1	0	4	1	0	1	-1
Total	3	3	2	9	3	2	4	-2

5.3 Vegetation

Vegetation was the second highest contributor to SAIDI in RY26. Moreover, from Figure b) in Section 5.1 we see that vegetation is a consistently high contributor to SAIDI and follows adverse weather closely. SAIDI from vegetation remains high, largely due to significant wind events impacting vegetation.

Our network, built in the 1950s and 60s, is a largely rural network originally designed and constructed to deliver electricity to extensive beef and sheep farms. In the 1980s, particularly after Cyclone Bola, farms were converted to forestry, typically with a mix of farming usually located at the end of a spur. The change from farming to forestry has seen many of our lines go from traversing mostly open farmland to running through the middle of large forestry plantations.

We have never built a distribution line through a forestry plantation. Most plantation owners maintain their lines within the growth limit zone of four (4) meters under the tree regulations. However, as trees approach harvesting, they can be over 30 meters tall. High winds combined with the wet conditions can result in several interruptions when plantation trees contacted our lines or fall through our lines.

We convene an Eastern Vegetation Management group forum to work with other EDBs on collective solutions to improve vegetation management outcomes. A new Future Hazards Notice has been developed, providing improved information on landowners' risks and obligation.

Table 16 (a) and (b) shows the event count and impact on SAIDI trend from vegetation, by category. It is clear from this that:

- Out-of-zone non-plantation trees contributed significantly to outage during the RY26 assessment period. Trees pose a significant hazard to distribution assets; strong winds increase this risk by toppling trees and breaking branches. The Tree Regulations are intended to give EDBs mandated powers to address the risk from trees. However, EDBs are not mandated to trim or remove trees outside the growth zone (i.e., out-of-zone trees). EDBs must negotiate with the tree owner to trim or remove trees at risk of damaging assets.
- A specific budget has been put in place for RY27 for out of zone vegetation.

Table 16: Vegetation outages by category cause of unplanned outages and impact on quality

(a) Event count

Vegetation	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY26	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Tree in zone	34	28	30	32	28	38	30	8
Tree Out of zone	31	33	76	43	79	39	52	-13
Plantation in zone	7	6	9	1	1	6	5	1
Plantation out of zone	13	9	24	12	23	11	16	-5
Grand Total	85	76	138	88	131	94	104	-10

(b) SAIDI

Vegetation	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Avg RY21-RY26	Variance between RY26 and avg (negative = a reduction in RY26)
Tree in zone	14	10	17	32	17	16	18	-2
Tree out of zone	22	18	353	45	118	26	111	-86
Plantation in zone	1	1	7	0	0	4	2	2
Plantation out of zone	14	5	267	13	47	8	69	-61
Grand Total	51	33	644	90	183	54	200	-146

Section 6.2 and the SRMP presents our plan to actively manage vegetation and reduce its impact on quality. Early results of our implementation of the plan are summarised in Table 17 and show promising results, namely:

- Feeders on which we concentrated effort on tree management have shown large reductions in SAIDI between RY25 and RY26.

While such reduction may be due to other factors in addition to good management (for example, from Figure (b) RY25 had more adverse weather impacts), the results are encouraging. The programme to manage vegetation therefore continues, with the worst performing feeders set out in Table 18 prioritised in the current year. The top five feeders in this table are prioritised for management.

*Table 17: unplanned SAIDI on feeders we have concentrated on to reduce SAIDI. * The Puha loop comprises several feeders in a ring arrangement between Gisborne, Puha, Ngātapa, Pehiri and Pātūtahi zone substations.*

Feeder	Feeder length, km	RY25 SAIDI	RY26 SAIDI	SAIDI variance (negative = a reduction in RY26)	Spend ($,000)
Tiki Tiki 0206	122	23.5	1.0	-23	342
Frasertown 3103	186	22.6	0.2	-22	370
Waimata 0903	134	13.2	2.2	-11	310
Makarika 0204	46	11.0	0.1	-11	90
Nuhaka 3203	64	7.7	0.0	-8	170
Muriwai 0905	68	6.4	0.9	-6	108
Village 2002	9	6.2	0.0	-6	107
Wainui 0504	8	0.7	0.0	-1	3
W O Kuri 1001	18	0.7	0.5	0	95
Puha loop*	20	0.0	0.0	0	11
Gis-TKB 5201	72	0.0	0.0	0	84
Tuai-WRA A 5004	34	0.0	0.0	0	0
Awapuni 0606	5	0.0	0.0	0	2
Esplanade 1503	8	0.0	0.0	0	4
Tuai-Gis A 5001	83	0.0	0.0	0	24
Nelson 0803	12	0.0	0.0	0	4
Total	890	92.0	4.8	-87	1,726

Table 18: Worst performing feeders from vegetation faults, with the top five of these feeders prioritised for vegetation management in RY26 and next year.

Feeder	SAIDI	SAIFI	Event count	Avg total time off, minutes
Raupunga 3101	8	0.0450	8	313
Whatatutu 1201	6	0.0168	5	361
Ruakituri 2003	5	0.0077	6	634
Matawai 1204	4	0.0077	4	458
Te Arai 0906	3	0.0047	2	1,363
Haisman 0804	3	0.0373	1	88
Tauwhareparae 0404	2	0.0086	6	376
Lavenham 0902	2	0.0299	3	187
Waimata 0903	2	0.0112	7	283
Tahora 1103	2	0.0044	3	537
Total	38	0.1732	45	4,601

5.4 Unknown causes

Quality degradation from outages of unknown causes persists (Figure 14). Unknown faults have impacted sub-transmission assets, with multiple sub-transmission lines tripping. These have high consequences due to the large number of customers they supply. We have developed our patrolling regime, with an initial visual inspection before re-livening and then a more comprehensive foot patrol inspection to try and ascertain the root cause of the outage. Even with these procedures in place, no obvious cause could be found for these faults, hence they were classified as unknown.

Continued monitoring and maintenance work on sub-transmission assets, outlined in Table 34 of Section 6.2, is aimed at identifying outages from unknown causes and faster resolution. In addition we have identified the worst performing feeder, Mātāwai, and are focusing efforts on that.

Figure 14: SAIDI from unknown cause faults.



5.5 Adverse weather

While the SAIDI value remains high, the customer minutes per fault caused by adverse weather has reduced somewhat, largely due to the increase in fuse re-instatement reporting. SAIDI due to adverse weather improved in RY26 compared to the average for DPP3, mainly because of the significant events in RY23 that increased the DPP3 averages. The feeders most impacted by adverse weather are listed in Table 12.

Table 19: Feeders most impacted by adverse weather in RY26.

Feeder	SAIDI	Event count	Travel Time >1 Hr	Historical WPF
Hicks Bay 0102	12.2	1	Yes	3
Waimata 0903	9.6	1	Yes	
Te Araroa 0103	6.8	3	Yes	
Nuhaka 3203	3.3	2	No	
Village 2002	3.0	5	Yes	
Matawai 1204	2.7	5	No	3
Tiniroto 1003	1.7	3	No	2
Tahaenui Mahia 3142	1.6	1	No	1
Ruakituri 2003	0.9	6	Yes	4
Mata 0304	0.8	4	Yes	2

Note: The Historical WPF column refers to the number of times the feeder has been ranked as a worst performing feeder in the past five years (blank means this is the first time it has been rated as 'worst performing'). Travel time over one hour refers to the travel time to the median point of the feeder.

Several feeders in the list in Table 12 require mention:

- Hicks bay did not appear in the top three for adverse weather in RY25. It has been elevated due to a severe weather event over the East Cape in January 2026 when one fault on the Hicks Bay feeder occurred. Flooding caused access issues, delaying repair. While this period was normalised, it was included in Table 12 because of the large impact of this event
- Waimātā did not appear in the top three for adverse weather in RY25. It has been elevated due to a weather event in RY26 in Waimātā. This involved suspected line clashing due to strong winds. However, there was a Transpower outage at the same time affecting restoration times. This event period was normalised, but is still included in Table 12 because of the large impact of this event on SAIDI
- Te Araroa did not appear in the top three for adverse weather in RY25. There were three events in RY26, two that damaged assets and one that blew fuses. Access to carry out one of the repairs was delayed. One event was damage to 55-year-old copper line, which is not regarded as end-of-life age. A second event was three-year-old pole that came down due to a river washout.

The network continues to suffer from adverse weather events which result in road closures, impacting restoration time. Figure 15 is a map[24] of road closures on February 24th.

[24] Source - Road information | Gisborne District Council

Figure 15: Gisborne District Council road closures



5.6 Third-party interference

Table 13 summarises the top ten third-party related unplanned outages by feeder. The high SAIDI value on the Massey Hexton line is due to it being a dual-voltage pole. As well as carrying an 11 kV distribution feeder, it carries 50 kV sub-transmission. The particularly high SAIDI from this feeder is mainly due to the 50 kV sub-transmission interruption which affected many consumers.

Table 20: Third-party interference contribution to quality by feeder.

Feeder	SAIDI	Event count
Massey Hexton 50 0851	11.4	1
Waimata 0903	4.5	5
Raupunga 3101	3.3	3
Tamarau 0503	2.3	1
Bushmere 0805	2.3	5
Muriwai 0905	2.2	3
Elgin 0703	2.0	1
Lavenham 0902	1.5	2
Ruakituri 2003	1.4	1
Hicks Bay 0102	0.8	1

We first summarise all third-party interference events leading to unplanned outages in Table 14. While Figure (a) shows an increasing trend in SAIDI, Table 14 does not indicate a particular trend, more a significant increase in events in RY26. Prior to RY26, this indicates that restoration of faults is taking longer, which is useful information for the third-party interference actions in Section 6.2.

It is useful to understand on which feeders, and in which network area, third-party events are occurring. Further, by examining events per 1,000 km of line we can better understand where there *may* be issues with high event counts, effectively by comparing feeders over the same length. This will further assist in prioritising actions set out in Section 6.2. Caution needs to be exercised, as the density of traffic travelling adjacent to a feeder may also affect event count.

We further summarise third-party outage numbers by vehicles in Table 15, overhead contact in Table 16, and other causes in Table 17. This shows that the leading cause of third-party interference is vehicles. Further, there is a particularly high rate of vehicle events on some feeders. As above, this provides information to prioritise feeders and consider actions that may reduce vehicle incidents.

Table 21: All third-party interference event counts that led to unplanned outages.

Feeder	Area	Length, km	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Total	Avg per year	Avg per year per 1,000 km
Waimata 0903	Gisborne	134	3	2	9	2	5	5	26	4.3	32
Muriwai 0905	Gisborne	68	2	4	3	2	1	3	15	2.5	37
Lavenham 0902	Gisborne	81	4	2	1	1	3	2	13	2.2	27
Mata 0304	Gisborne	126	2	5	1	2	0	3	13	2.2	17
Bushmere 0805	Gisborne	24	2	2	0	1	0	5	10	1.7	71
Raupunga 3101	Wairoa	199	0	1	1	1	0	3	6	1.0	5
Tiki Tiki 0206	Gisborne	122	0	3	1	0	1	0	5	0.8	7
Matawai 1204	Gisborne	234	3	0	0	1	0	1	5	0.8	3
Te Karaka 1203	Gisborne	29	1	0	3	0	0	0	4	0.7	24
Tamarau 0503	Gisborne	11	0	0	2	0	1	1	4	0.7	64
Kanakanaia 1202	Gisborne	43	0	0	1	2	0	1	4	0.7	16
Frasertown 3103	Wairoa	186	0	1	0	1	0	2	4	0.7	4
Te Arai 0906	Gisborne	82	1	2	1	0	0	0	4	0.7	9
Nuhaka 3203	Wairoa	64	1	0	0	0	2	1	4	0.7	11
JNL_A 1405	Gisborne	5	0	0	2	1	0	1	4	0.7	138
Willows 0702	Gisborne	12	0	1	1	2	0	0	4	0.7	58
Rototahi 0403	Gisborne	43	2	0	0	1	1	0	4	0.7	16
Whatatutu 1201	Gisborne	93	1	0	2	0	1	0	4	0.7	8
Morere 3401	Wairoa	64	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	0.5	8
Harris 1502	Gisborne	6	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	0.5	79
W O Kuri 1001	Gisborne	18	2	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.5	28
Mahia 3301	Wairoa	101	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0.5	5
Makarika 0204	Gisborne	46	2	0	0	0	0	1	3	0.5	11
Hicks Bay 0102	Gisborne	70	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	0.5	7
Ruakituri 2003	Gisborne	116	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	3
Dalton 0502	Gisborne	94	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.3	3
Inland 0301	Gisborne	50	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.3	6
Awatere 0101	Gisborne	47	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.3	6
Elgin 0703	Gisborne	6	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	52
Massey Carnarvon 50 0650	Gisborne	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0.3	66
Toko Tie 0401	Gisborne	37	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.3	8
Ruatoria 0201	Gisborne	21	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	9
Massey Hexton 50 0851	Gisborne	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	43
Borough Two 3205	Wairoa	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	17
Kiwi B 3206	Wairoa	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	79
Remaining feeders		291	2	2	4	5	5	0	18	3.0	10
Total		2,551	35	30	34	25	22	41	187	31.2	12

Table 22: Third-party interference related unplanned outage numbers due to vehicles (vehicles colliding with a pole).

Feeder	Area	Length, km	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Total	Avg per year	Avg per year per 1,000 km
Waimata 0903	Gisborne	134	3	2	8	2	3	3	21	3.5	26
Muriwai 0905	Gisborne	68	2	4	3	1	1	3	14	2.3	34
Lavenham 0902	Gisborne	81	4	2	1	1	2	2	12	2.0	25
Bushmere 0805	Gisborne	24	2	2	0	1	0	5	10	1.7	71
Mata 0304	Gisborne	126	2	1	1	1	0	1	6	1.0	8
Tiki Tiki 0206	Gisborne	122	0	2	1	0	1	0	4	0.7	6
Te Karaka 1203	Gisborne	29	1	0	3	0	0	0	4	0.7	24
JNL_A 1405	Gisborne	5	0	0	2	1	0	1	4	0.7	138
Rototahi 0403	Gisborne	43	2	0	0	1	1	0	4	0.7	16
Tamarau 0503	Gisborne	11	0	0	2	0	0	1	3	0.5	46
Hicks Bay 0102	Gisborne	70	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	0.5	7
Nuhaka 3203	Wairoa	64	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0.5	8
Whatatutu 1201	Gisborne	93	1	0	2	0	0	0	3	0.5	5
Ruakituri 2003	Gisborne	116	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	3
Harris 1502	Gisborne	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.3	48
Elgin 0703	Gisborne	6	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	52
Inland 0301	Gisborne	50	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.3	6
Raupunga 3101	Wairoa	199	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.3	2
Dalton 0502	Gisborne	94	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.3	3
Willows 0702	Gisborne	12	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.3	25
Massey Hexton 50 0851	Gisborne	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	43
Remaining feeders		985	4	5	5	5	2	0	21	3.5	4
Total		2,345	25	22	30	17	12	21	127	21.2	9

Table 23: Third-party interference related unplanned outage numbers due to overhead contact (RY21 and RY22 not available).

Feeder	Area	Length, km	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Total	Avg per year	Avg per year per 1,000 km
Waimata 0903	Gisborne	134			1	0	1	1	3	0.8	6
Raupunga 3101	Wairoa	199			0	0	0	2	2	0.5	3
Frasertown 3103	Wairoa	186			0	1	0	1	2	0.5	3
Nuhaka 3203	Wairoa	64			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	5
Harris 1502	Gisborne	6			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	48
Kiwi B 3206	Wairoa	3			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	118
Toko Tie 0401	Gisborne	37			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	8
Morere 3401	Wairoa	64			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	5
Matawai 1204	Gisborne	234			0	0	0	1	1	0.3	1
Remaining feeders		253			0	1	4	0	5	1.3	5
Total		1,182			1	2	5	10	18	4.5	4

Table 24: Third-party interference related unplanned outage numbers due to other causes.

Feeder	Area	Length, km	RY21	RY22	RY23	RY24	RY25	RY26	Total	Avg per year	Avg per year per 1,000 km
Mata 0304	Gisborne	126	0	4	0	1	0	2	7	1.2	10
Matawai 1204	Gisborne	234	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.5	2
Te Arai 0906	Gisborne	82	1	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.5	6
Kanakanaia 1202	Gisborne	43	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.3	7
Raupunga 3101	Wairoa	199	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	2
Makarika 0204	Gisborne	46	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.3	7
W O Kuri 1001	Gisborne	18	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.3	17
Frasertown 3103	Wairoa	186	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	1
Morere 3401	Wairoa	64	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	3
Waimata 0903	Gisborne	134	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	1
Borough Two 3205	Wairoa	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	17
Ruatoria 0201	Gisborne	21	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	9
Remaining feeders		596	3	2	1	3	3	0	12	2.0	3
Total			10	8	3	4	3	10	38		

5.7 Wildlife

As identified in Figure (a) there is a slight increasing trend in SAIDI from wildlife, although it is well below the contribution of defective equipment for example. Nevertheless, we have investigated wildlife further with the following results:

- Bird count has had the largest impact on SAIDI however the events occurred across the network and there are only three locations reported between RY21 and RY26 that have had more than two bird strikes, otherwise there does not appear to be a systemic issue. The significant feeders and events in RY26 contributing to SAIDI by more than 1 minute being:
    - Mahia 3301 feeder, SAIDI of 5.41 from a single event. In this case birds contacted a conductor at a transformer late at night. Mahia 3301 is a 100 km long feeder, and restoration did not occur until the following morning due to the time required to identify the fault and the extensive damage caused by the fault.
    - Tiki Tiki 0206 feeder, SAIDI of 1.62 from three events. The bird contact with the feeder in each event occurred at different locations.
    - Mātāwai 1204 feeder, SAIDI of 1.10 from three events
    - Whatatutu 12-1 feeder, SAIDI of 1.06 from two events
    - Frasertown 3103 feeder, SAIDI of 1.04 from two events
    - Muriwai feeder is one location that has had multiple bird strikes and a project to install bird divertors on the line is in progress.

- 36 (71%) of the faults caused by wildlife events were restored by fuse reinstatement. Fuse reinstatement was not recorded in DPP2, but started in DPP3, and we have been working since then on improved reporting, seeing an increase from RY21 of twelve events to 36 in RY26. Thus, the increase in fault count can be attributed in part to improved reporting, in line with our improvement actions around wildlife.

- The contribution of SAIDI from possums is lower by an order of magnitude or more than that from birds.

Our Strategic Reliability Management Plan [7] has an action to examine recurring fault types. Combined with the information used to compile the summary above and increased reporting of fuse reinstatement of faults, this improves data to direct this work.

5.8 Lightning

A trend in lightning is difficult to ascertain from 13(a), although RY26 did have a large increase over the average of the previous 5 years (DPP3) as follows:

- SAIDI of 13.67 in RY26 compared to an average of 5.74 in the previous five years.
- Event count of 117 in RY26 compared to an average of 55 over the previous five years.

This may not be a trend, but a change from year-to-year as shown in Figure (a). Hence this will require close attention in RY27. The following feeders had the highest contribution to SAIDI in RY26 (those above 1.0):

- Muriwai 0905, SAIDI of 3.81 from five events
- Mahia 3301, SAIDI of 1.47 from one event
- Whatatutu 1201, SAIDI of 1.07 from four events

Muriwai suffered from three events where transformers were damaged, one event impacting three transformers.

Because Mahia is an exposed coastal peninsula, it experiences higher average wind speeds and is highly susceptible to localised maritime thunderstorms, but the specific number of lightning strikes fluctuates dramatically depending on seasonal weather patterns.

An action has been raised from our reliability review and will be added to our SRMP to revisit lightning protection.

5.9 Worst performing feeders

While the previous sections deal with specific causes of unplanned outages by feeders, we compile the worst performing feeders by SAIDI in this section, summarised Table 25. This provides further information for the programmes discussed in section 6.2 Table 33 to prioritise where to focus actions and resources. From information in the previous sections, we have also assessed the causes of SAIDI on these worst performing feeders, which are summarised in Table 19.

Table 25: Worst performing feeders.

Feeder	Area	Length, km	Event count	SAIDI	Total time off, minutes	Avg time off per event, minutes	Travel time over one hour	Historical WPF	SAIDI minutes per 1,000 km
Matawai 1204	Gisborne	234	63	38.2	88,426	1,404	No	3	163
Crawford 1504	Gisborne	9	1	32.4	5,265	5,265	No		3,506
Hicks Bay 0102	Gisborne	70	19	18.5	30,989	1,631	Yes	2	263
Waimata 0903	Gisborne	134	36	17.8	17,224	478	Yes	1	132
Raupunga 3101	Wairoa	199	43	17.2	51,457	1,197	Yes	4	86
Mahia 3301	Wairoa	101	16	17.1	26,587	1,662	No	3	169
Massey-Hexton 50kV CB1	Gisborne	5	1	11.4	1,497	1,497	No		2,457
Tauwhareparae 0404	Gisborne	111	39	10.8	28,349	727	Yes	3	98
Whatatutu 1201	Gisborne	93	20	9.9	16,847	842	Yes	2	106
Tahora 1103	Gisborne	84	15	9.0	15,427	1,028	No	1	107
Total		1,042	253	182.3	282,068	1,115			175

Note: The Historical WPF column refers to the number of times the feeder has been ranked as a worst performing feeder in the past five years (blank means this is the first time it has been rated as 'worst performing'). Travel time over one hour refers to the travel time to the median point of the feeder.

Mātāwai is a long feeder at 234 km and has had the highest SAIDI and number of events recorded of all feeders in RY26. Mātāwai has been a top ten worst performing feeder in three of the previous five years. The biggest contributors in RY26 have been unknown cause (11 events, 16.56 SAIDI), conductor (8 events, 7.09 SAIDI), hardwood pole failures (6 events, 3.3 SAIDI) and vegetation (4 events, 4.01 SAIDI). It is recommended that the feeder is prioritised for inspection and identified corrective works be carried out.

Crawford was impacted by one fault at Kaiti substation. When back feeding, a cable was overloaded and failed. The cause of the fault was condensation causing a flashover. Actions are in progress to remove the root cause of this and verify that other substations do not have the same risk. Crawford is not historically a poor performing feeder.

Hicks Bay was hit by a severe weather event on 22 January 2026 causing significant damage, contributing 12.15 SAIDI – as discussed in the major events section. Access to the area was blocked, delaying restoration. Hicks Bay is a historically poor performing feeder, and its location creates higher risk of impact from a fault.

Waimatā is a long feeder at 134km and has been in the top ten worst performing feeders once over the previous five years. The biggest contributors in RY26 have been weather and recurring car hitting pole incidents. It has also had 15 unknown events contributing 0.66 SAIDI. It is recommended that the feeder is prioritised for inspection and identified corrective works carried out.

Table 26: Worst performing feeders with cause of SAIDI ranked.

Feeder	No 1 Cause	No 2 Cause	No 3 Cause
Matawai 1204	Unknown cause	Defective Equipment	Vegetation
Crawford 1504	Defective Equipment		
Hicks Bay 0102	Adverse weather	Defective Equipment	Vegetation
Waimata 0903	Adverse weather	Third Party Interference	Vegetation
Raupunga 3101	Vegetation	Defective Equipment	Third Party Interference
Mahia 3301	Unknown cause	Wildlife	Defective Equipment
Massey-Hexton 50kV CB172	Third Party Interference		
Tauwhareparae 0404	Defective Equipment	Adverse Environment	Vegetation
Whatatutu 1201	Vegetation	Lightning	Wildlife
Tahora 1103	Defective Equipment	Vegetation	Wildlife

6 What we are doing to improve:

This section outlines our actions to address the causes of unplanned interruptions that were identified in Section 5.

Reliability improvement actions have been identified through previous reviews (refer to section 3.1) and are now consolidated in the new Strategic Reliability Management Plan (SRMP) [7]. In this section we assess the progress of existing initiatives and identify new initiatives created to address newly identified network issues.

- Section 6.1 provides an overview of our Strategic Reliability Management Plan and how it is now the central document for managing reliability and ensuring return to compliance with the Quality Standards
- Section 6.2 assesses our progress against each of the reliability improvement actions that have been identified and initiated based on our past network reviews and identifies new actions for RY27.
- Section 6.3 identified new initiatives that have been identified to address new emerging issues on the network.

6.1 Strategic Reliability Management Plan (SRMP) [7]

We released our SRMP in RY26. The SRMP provides a framework for improving reliability and resilience across our network. This formalises and centralises all improvement initiatives, including those initiated in RY24, external reviews detailed in section 3 and the annual reliability review update detailed in section 6.2. This is a major improvement in our operational and management processes. The cross functional Asset Management Committee (AMC) team is responsible for ongoing development and implementation of the SRMP. Progress of the SRMP actions is reviewed monthly by the AMC and quarterly by the dedicated Board sub-committee.

Figure 16 is an extract from our SRMP initiatives management tool. that our dedicated SRMP Program Manager uses to track progress with workstream leads monthly. The tool details delivery priority, expected outcome and target dates.

Figure 16: Extract of SRMP improvement initiatives

Initiatives	Main actions/activities	Expected output	Workstream lead (original)	Status as at May 2026	To complete by (original date)	RAG status	Priority
Direct engagement with major users	Integrate major users insights into reliability improvement roadmap and AMP planning	Actions logged and tracked through AMC dashboard	Manager, Firstlight Commercial	Planned	Q2 RY27		Medium
AM system improvements	Implement asset class hierarchy and strategy documents	Approved asset class hierarchy and strategies published	Manager, Electrical Engineering	Complete	Q3 RY26		High
Investment decision-making	Analyse defective equipment trends and incorporate into 5/10/30-year capital expenditure planning	Long-term Capex plan informed by defect trend data	Manager, Asset Planning	Planned	Q1 RY28		Medium
Review and feedback processes	Implement annual internal review of reliability and AMP improvement initiative	Documented review process and annual summary report	Manager, Asset Planning	Planned	Q4 RY27		High
Tree regulations preparations	Develop internal risk assessment methodology for adoption of updated tree regulations and identify/map high-risk forestry corridors outside GLZs	Internal risk assessment framework and mapped corridors	Manager, Field Operations	Complete	Q1 RY27		High
Out-of-zone risk management	Develop internal risk assessment methodology for out-of-zone vegetation aligned with upcoming tree regulations	Documented risk assessment framework and procedure	Manager, Field Operations	Complete	Q2 RY27		High
Automation	Completion of phase 2 fault indicator programme	Fault indicators commissioned and operational	Manager, Electrical Engineering	In progress	Q3 RY27		High
Outage response process	Implement 'find & fix' duration metrics to identify delay patterns and improve restoration times	Find & fix dashboard	Manager, Network Control	In progress	Q2 RY27		High
Critical spares	Develop critical spares strategy and stocklist	Approved critical spares strategy and stock register	Manager, Electrical Engineering	Planned	Q2 RY27		High
Contingency planning	Develop a fuel plan capturing fuel requirements and guidance for personnel and outsourced service providers on what actions should be taken to secure fuel supply when normal supply chains are limited or unavailable.	Plan developed with fuel requirements, and how to supply.	N/A	Planned	Q1 RY28		TBA
Outage response process	Install a new generator on Raupunga feeder	Generator installed	N/A	In progress	Q2 RY27		Critical
Renewal strategies	Continuation of accelerated pole replacement programme	Plan to replace 700 poles on average per annum over DPP4 included in AMP	N/A	Complete	Q1 RY27		High
Automation	Install the next tranche of automated protection devices	Automated devices operational and integrated to SCADA		In progress	Q2 RY27		Critical

Figure 17 is the reporting dashboard that was presented to the AMC and the board sub-committee in June 2026 and is updated monthly.

Figure 17: SRMP reporting dashboard

6.2 Progress of reliability initiatives

The reliability review presented in the RY25 Unplanned Outages Report classified issues leading to degradation of reliability of our assets into the following issue categories:

- Feeders
- Poles
- Cables faults
- Conductor faults

This sub-section reports on the status of actions to improve each of these, and new actions identified from the RY26 annual reliability review[25]. The status reported is incremental on the status reported in the RY25 unplanned outages report – we do not

[25] As required by clause 12.4(d) and 12.4(e) of the DPP determination.

revisit completed actions from that report. However, we do comment on the status of planned actions from the RY25 report. Additionally, we have added further issue categories, identified from our assessment of trends in Section 5. They are:

- Switchgear
- Third-party interference
- Adverse weather
- Sub-transmission faults (unknown cause)
- Out of zone vegetation

Each of the issue categories is addressed in a separate table, and where additional to the RY25 report (the above list) it is identified as ‘new’. Numbering is added to align with our internal Reliability Review [2].

Table 27: Reliability performance review – feeder security.

Cause of unreliability and brief background (Referred to as issue in the RY25 report)	Planned action from RY25 report	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
1. Consider network extensions to reduce the impact of severe weather	"Consider the viability of building a new zone substation near to Gisborne Substation to supply its surrounding areas and reduce customer numbers on some of the long town feeders and decrease demand on Substations."	An optioneering study has been completed to identify a zone substation location for improved security in Gisborne city. Two second hand early life power transformers have been purchased from another EDB with the intent of reducing load on some city feeders.	The study is being reviewed and validated for forward planning . A project to be created to install purchased transformers.
	Formally identify locations for potential network interconnections	Network interconnection options have been loaded in our risk identification register as mitigation options.	Analysis to be undertaken to confirm locations and cost of viable network interconnection
2. Where network extension is not feasible, consider permanently located diesel generations as backup supply during outages	There is a capital project planned to install a new generator on the Raupunga feeder during RY 2026.	A project is in progress to install the generator. Land has been secured.	Installation of the generator is scheduled for July-August 2026.

Table 28: Reliability performance review – poles.

Cause of unreliability and brief background (Referred to as issue in the RY25 report)	Planned action from RY25 report	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
3. Reliability analysis and the pole inspection programme indicate the need to continue with an increased pole replacement programme.	"The increased programme will continue during RY2026 with target areas identified for H1 pole replacements."	Planned to be 750 poles per year, currently at 682, restricted by weather in RY26 being replaced (this is an increase from 450 poles replaced in early DPP3). A new pole inspection standard, based on the EEA standard, has been developed, adopting the EEA standard which has improved the prioritising of pole replacement. Pole inspectors re-trained to new inspection standard. The new structure inspection application has been in place for one year and is providing greater information on structures.	The increased pole replacement to continue in RY27. Priority placed on H1 health poles
	"Work to inspect hard to access areas of the network (such as the Tahaenui feeder) via drone will be considered for RY 2026."	This has not been progressed due to resourcing.	Work to inspect hard to access areas of the network via droning will be considered. A LIDAR survey is programmed to be carried out across the network in RY27

Table 29: Reliability performance review – cables (not numbered to date).

Cause of unreliability and brief background (Referred to as issue in the RY25 report)	Planned action from RY25 report	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
Underground cable faults have been focussed on several urban feeders, while the core reasons for the failures are not clear. Some kind of remote monitoring should be used to reduce the response times to any unplanned faults.		The increased use of automated ring-main-units (RMUs) is supporting more rapid recovery post faults occurring in cables. All RMUs now purchased with fault indication	Develop cable assessment approach; overhead has been prioritised due to higher fault count.

Table 30: Reliability performance review – switchgear (new).

Cause of unreliability and brief background	Planned action or recommendation	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
4. Failure of ground mounted switchgear	To minimise the risk of failures, it is recommended that a program be established to (a) replace the oil insulated switchgear units (these are no longer available and it is company policy to not operate them for fault finding due to the risk of arc flash), and (b) when replacing, inspect and install Guroflex (an insulation that prevents flashover).	Oil switchgear replacement with SF6 was reinstated and continues with a forecast programme. Ten units were replaced in RY26.	Replacement programme to continue. Consider new models that do not use SF6.

Table 31: Reliability performance review – conductors.

Cause of unreliability and brief background (Referred to as issue in the RY25 report)	Planned action from RY25 report	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
5. Conductor faults are increasing in number and have increasing consequences. While inspections are not effective from the ground, we have carried out a drone-based inspection on two feeders	Develop a programme for aerial inspections of feeders, particularly involving long rural feeders with sections of line that are difficult to access. Such feeders would include Hicks Bay, Mata, Tauwhareparae, Wairoa-Tahaenui. RY2026	We have reviewed costings for copper conductor aerial inspection, however cost is significant and has not progressed to date.	This requires a re-focus.
	Develop a programme to carry out physical testing on sample conductors to better understand condition in line with recent EEA guideline.	Inspection standard for conductor has been updated. A programme was raised to return failed conductor samples where feasible for strength testing. Resourcing to carry out strength testing has not been available.	Refocus resource on conductor failure samples and increase focus on conductor analysis and renewal.

Table 32: Reliability performance review – third-party interference (new).

Cause of unreliability and brief background	Planned action or recommendation	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
6. Third-party interference events are continuing. While a reduction in the third-party event count occurred in RY24 and RY25, SAIDI remained at similar levels. Events have increased in RY26.	A review into further protection measures and new technology to mitigate third-party interferences has been recommended.		Review locations on high incident feeders to reduce potential of vehicle impact

Table 33: Reliability performance review – adverse weather and environment (new).

Cause of unreliability and brief background	Planned action or recommendation	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
7. Several contributors have resulted in the breach of SAIDI metric including adverse weather and adverse environment. The combination of these has led to more events that take longer to resolve due to challenging access, with safety of staff being a key consideration in such circumstances.	Our Strategic Reliability Management Plan released December 2025 outlines areas for improvement.	Our initial automation programme is complete with exception of one unit, rescheduled to RY27. A programme for RY27 has been developed. Phases 2 and 3 of line fault indicator (LFI) installation have been identified. Auto reclose has been implemented in several locations. Automation, LFI and 50kV Auto reclose is being measured for quality metrics before and after installation, with results demonstrating improvement.	Install automation and LFI's identified in the RY27 Programme. Review of contractor performance metrics.
8. Added actions from RY26 analysis. Identification of worst performing feeders.	Prioritise inspection of defined worst performing feeders and carry out necessary corrective work.		Prioritise inspection on Matawai, Hicks Bay and Waimata feeders.
9. There were 117 lightning events in RY26. Lightning arrestors were removed from certain locations on the network in RY25 as they were failing.	Review options to reduce/prevent damage from lightning.		Generate a program for installation of an improved lightning protection solution where appropriate.

Table 34: Reliability performance review – unknown sub-transmission faults (new).

Cause of unreliability and brief background	Planned action or recommendation	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
10. There has been an increase in sub-transmission unknown faults		Auto-reclose has been implemented on sub-transmission which has provided significant savings. A project for replacement of insulators on the 50KV Coastline is in progress. We have increased visual inspections of sub-transmission	Develop Distance to Fault indication.

Table 35: Reliability performance review – out of zone vegetation faults (new).

Cause of unreliability and brief background	Planned action or recommendation	Status at the end of RY26	Actions planned for RY27
11. There was an increase in the impact from out of zone vegetation in RY25 and a decrease in RY26. This is driven by mature trees and forestry adjacent to key feeders. These trees are outside the growth limit zone but still capable of striking the network under wind or harvest conditions.	Continue targeted identification of high-risk out of zone trees along critical feeders Prioritise corridors based on risk (feeder performance and exposure) Increase engagement with forestry owners to manage fall-zone risk based on actual risk level Where possible, apply cost recovery where damage occurs to reinforce accountability	Risk areas identified and partially mapped through inspections Initial engagement underway with key forestry stakeholders Reactive response to damage events continuing, but not yet fully embedded as a proactive programme	Our priority is both identification and increased management of out of zone vegetation risk, moving from reactive to a more pro-active risk-based approach covering both identification and mitigation. Funding has been dedicated to out of zone vegetation. Specific actions are listed below this table.

Specific actions planned for RY27 vegetation management are:

- Expand proactive identification of out of zone risk across priority feeders
- Increase resource applied to engagement with forestry owners and large landholders
- Develop a more structured programme to manage fall-zone risk (not just GLZ encroachments)
- Strengthen use of cost recovery and supporting case law where damage occurs
- Integrate this into our wider vegetation strategy and planning cycles
- Establish a separate budget category for out of zone vegetation management in RY27, enabled by the DPP uplift, to specifically target identification and mitigation of this risk.

6.3 Improvement initiatives

6.3.1 Improving fault restoration from adverse weather and vegetation events

Many of our feeders are long and in rural locations with difficult access in poor weather. The analysis from Section 5 indicates that faults on long feeders, can contribute more to SAIDI due to longer restoration times. It is with these in mind that we continue our programme from previous years to:

(a) improve our ability to remotely isolate parts of the network for fault finding,

(b) understand where faults have occurred, and

(c) enable auto-reclose on sub-transmission

all with the aim to reduce fault resolution time.

The specific programmes, continued in RY26, are the implementation of rural automation, fault indication and auto-reclose on sub-transmission.

Early results are that these are delivering benefits, as set out in Table 36. The initiatives have not all been installed for a full year, therefore greater savings are expected. i.e. The auto-reclose was implemented in October 2025 and had a SAIDI prevention of seven minutes, therefore in a full year has the potential to be higher.

Table 36: Estimated initiative SAIDI and SAIFI savings

Initiative	Year to Date SAIDI prevention	Year to Date SAIFI prevention
Sectionalisers and new reclosers	22.4	0.187
Fault Indicators	6.2	N/A
Auto Reclose on sub-transmission	7.0	0.163
Total	**35.6**	**0.350**

In addition to the initiatives in Table 36, we have made improvements to SAIDI from the following initiatives:

- Vegetation feeders worked on (based on RY25 comparison): reduction in SAIDI of 87.15 minutes, as discussed in Section 5.3.
- Use of generators to supply customers during unplanned outages. This has resulted in a reduction of 216 SAIDI minutes.
- Additional work on 50 kV sub-transmission, which as identified in Section 5.1 needs ongoing focus. This includes insulator replacement on the Gisborne-Tolaga Bay sub-transmission circuit, possum guards on 50 kV poles, protection of 50 kV reclosers, and annual sub-transmission inspections with corrective action. We expect these to improve sub-transmission performance, something that we will endeavour to measure.

6.3.2 Worst performing feeders

We have made recommendations to address the consistently worst performing feeders identified in Section 5.9. In summary they are:

- Prioritise inspection of the Mātāwai feeder and carry out identified corrective work
- Prioritise inspection of the Hicks Bay feeder and carry out identified corrective work. Review line routing to determine risks for future severe weather
- Prioritise inspection of Waimatā feeder and carry out identified corrective work.

6.3.3 Asset health

In our unplanned interruptions report for RY25, we indicated that we were looking to move away from the Distributed Network Model to REPEX modelling for asset health and renewal. We have now implemented it in RY26 for all assets. The REPEX model is aligned to the EEA's Asset Health and Asset Criticality guidelines, which essentially follow a qualitative treatment, allowing its users a pathway to improve their asset renewal decision making processes.

Figure 18 is the health model of our assets using REPEX for RY26. As this is a different methodology from previous years, a like for like comparison is not appropriate.

Figure 18: REPEX model of asset base



7 Intended reviews, analysis, and further investigations

Our focus over this year is to continue to implement the findings from the external reviews as set out in Section 3.[26], including both those commissioned by us and others.

The recommendations are progressing along with the actions in section 6 for incorporation into our SRMP and programmed to be addressed.

The analysis in Section 5 has provided substantial information on the source of SAIDI in our network. In turn, it has enabled us to continue to prioritise where to place our resources on improving our network, as set out in Section 6. A similar internal investigation will be undertaken at the end of RY27 to

- continue to measure the improvement from our initiatives,
- assess trends in events, SAIDI and SAIFI on our network, and from these
- re-assess the areas of our network requiring improvement. If necessary, changes to our priorities will be made.

Further, as identified in earlier sections, our SRMP and implementation of it has monthly reviews by the Asset management committee and quarterly reviews by a board sub-committee, with a more in-depth annual review.

Our quality has improved over time to this assessment period. With focus on more rapid location and resolution of faults, defective equipment, vegetation, and implementation of recommendations from independent reviews, we are confident of continuing improvement in our quality. We are committed to continuing our investigations into our network performance each year, to improve customer supply quality.

In line with this, and the initiatives outlined in Section 6, we have forecast our SAIDI by RY28 based on the expected SAIDI reductions from the various initiatives. The forecast is set out in Figure 19 as a 'waterfall' of each contributing reduction, resulting in the total reduction by RY28.

[26] As required by clause 12.4(f) of the DPP determination.

Figure 19: RY28 SAIDI forecast, (minutes)



8 Director certification

Clause 12.4(g) requires a certificate in the form set out in Schedule 10, signed by at least one Director of Firstlight Network. Below we have provided the director certification in the form prescribed by the DPP Determination and signed by two directors of Firstlight Network.

8.1 Director certification unplanned interruption reporting

I, John Loughlin, being (a) director of Powerco and Firstlight Network Limited as from 31 July 2026, certify to the best of our knowledge that, having made all reasonable enquiry available to us in the circumstances, including review of and reasonable reliance on information, processes and representations provided by Clarus and relevant Clarus and Firstlight personnel on or after 31 July 2026 pursuant to a transitional services agreement, the attached unplanned interruptions reporting of Firstlight Network Limited, and related information, prepared for the purposes of the *Electricity Distribution Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2025* has been prepared in accordance with all the relevant requirements.

For the avoidance of doubt, Powerco Limited acquired upstream ownership of Firstlight Network Limited after the end of the compliance period to which this unplanned interruptions reporting relates. This certification is provided on the basis of reasonable enquiry given the circumstances and reliance on information, processes and representations provided by Clarus and Firstlight staff in relation to that period.

Director

25 August 2026

Date

Note: Section 103(2) of the Commerce Act 1986 provides that no person shall attempt to deceive or knowingly mislead the Commission in relation to any matter before it. It is an offence to contravene section 103(2) and any person who does so is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 in the case of an individual or $300,000 in the case of a body corporate.

9 Network feeders

Figure 20: Feeder map

10 References

[1] Commerce Commission New Zealand, "Electricity Distribution Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2025 [2024] NZCC 28 (the DPP Determination)," 20-11-2024.

[2] Firstlight Network, RY2026 Reliability Review, June 2026.

[3] PBA, Firstlight Network Unplanned Interruptions Review, April-November 2023, 16-1-2024.

[4] Asset Dynamics, Firstlight Network Resilience Management Maturity Assessment RY26, 24-11-2025.

[5] Asset Dynamics, Firstlight Network Asset Management Maturity Assessment RY26, 4-11-2025.

[6] Firstlight Network, "Asset Management Plan Update," Firstlight network, 31 March 2026.

[7] Firstlight Network, "Strategic reliability management plan," 8-1-2026.

[8] Firstlight Network, "Unplanned interruptions report for the assessment period ended 31 March 2025," 13-8-2025.

11 Glossary

Abbreviation	Meaning
ABS	Air Break Switch – a pole mounted distribution switch, typically operable from the ground, ganged across three circuit phases with limited load break capability
AMC	Asset Management Committee
AMMAT	Asset Management Maturity Assessment Tool
Assessment period	The period of assessment of network quality, being a regulatory year
Cable	An underground cable
CAIDI	Customer Average Interruption Duration Index – the average interruption duration that a given customer would experience, or the average supply restoration time, usually expressed in minutes
Conductor	An overhead conductor (also referred to as a line)
Distribution	Electricity network equipment that supplies rural localities or urban suburbs, typically operating at 11,000 V (11 kV)
DPP4	The fourth default price path period, a period of five regulatory years beginning on 1 April 2025. RY26 and RY27 are therefore in DPP4, while RY21 to RY25 were in the earlier DPP3
EDB	Electricity distribution business
EEA	Electricity Engineers' Association
kV	Kilo volt
LFI	Line Fault Indicator – LFIs are devices that can measure the current through the conductor of an overhead line to which they are attached. Installed by a competent person with a hot stick, they can signal to fault staff if they have detected a fault beyond them, and therefore the direction of the fault
Low Voltage (LV)	Electricity network equipment operating at 400V (two or three phase) or 230V (single phase)
Major event	A SAIDI major event is a period of 24 hours where the sum of SAIDI over that period for unplanned interruptions exceeds the SAIDI unplanned boundary value
REPEX	An asset renewal forecasting modelling concept that seeks to minimise the present value of the economic costs associated with long life asset ownership. REPEX modelling differs from DNO techniques because they are more attuned to qualitative techniques.
RMMAT	Resilience Management Maturity Assessment Tool
RY	A regulatory year ending on 31 March of the year given. For example, RY 26 ended on 31 March 2026 (and began 1 April 2025). In this report it may also be referred to as RY2026 or 'The 2026 regulatory year'
SAIDI	System Average Interruption Duration Index – the length of time that a customer experiences without supply on average during a year, usually expressed in minutes
SAIFI	System Average Interruption Frequency Index – the number of supply interruptions that a customer experiences on average during a year
SF6	Sulphur hexafluoride, a colourless, odourless gas used as an insulating medium in electrical switchgear
SRMP	Strategic Reliability Management Plan
Subtransmission	Electricity network equipment that supplies electricity supply zones (large rural areas or

	suburbs). Typically operating at 110 kV, 66 kV, 50 kV or 33 kV
Threshold	The threshold applied to SAIDI and SAIFI during a major event